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I. INTRODUCTION
I am most pleased to have been invited by the editors of the
Chapman Law Review to write the Foreword to a volume devoted
to one of the hardy perennials of constitutional law: What level of
protection, if any, is accorded to private property and economic
liberties under the United States Constitution? There are a mul-
titude of ways in which this vital question can be approached. It
is possible for textualists to conduct a detailed, clause-bound in-
terpretation in order to determine the extent to which these rights
are protected, seriatim, under various clauses of the Constitution.
That list is a long one, and includes the Takings Clause, both Due
Process Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the Speech and Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment, and the Commerce Clause
in both its affirmative and (more controversial) dormant manifes-
tations. None of these clauses uses exactly the same language,
and it is possible to devote extensive discussion to the scope of
each clause. One could ask why the Contracts Clause does not
contain a "just compensation" component while the Takings
Clause does, or why the Due Process Clause refers to property
simpliciter, without adjective private, or most critically, why a po-
lice power limitation is found everywhere in the case law and the
interpretive literature, but nowhere in the constitutional text
itself.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi-
cago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. I would like to
thank Eric Claeys for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Justin Herring for his
able research assistance.
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Alternatively, these gaps in the text invite the diligent theo-
rist to undertake a detailed historical exegesis into the original
understanding of the Framers and of the early judges, both fed-
eral and state, who were charged with the overall interpretation
and implementation of constitutional guarantees. At this point,
exhaustive reference could be made to secondary sources to estab-
lish both the ordinary meaning of terms and the specific under-
standings that surrounded the adoption of particular clauses.
Often this learned search will lead us far afield. However, in most
cases, my clear sense (not shared, I suspect, by professional his-
torians) is that ninety percent of the relevant historical evidence
is contained in the Federalist Papers, even after we try to discount
for its own pro-ratification agenda. Both inquiries require exten-
sive labor, which cannot be carried out in the confines of this short
Foreword. But they do not exhaust the possible approaches to
constitutional law.
In this Foreword I wish to look at the question of takings and
economic liberties from what I like to call, only half-facetiously,
"necessary history." The purpose of this exercise is to show that
there are certain powerful principles to which any conscientious
application of constitutional discourse or doctrine must turn if it is
to meet the minimum standards of intellectual coherence and
practical common sense. In my view, this form of history is not
clause-bound in any strict sense of the term, but rather rests on
the broader considerations of the proper relationship between an
individual and the state, or, in some cases, the relationships be-
tween states in a federal system to each other and to the national
government.
To be sure, the use of terminology will differ as we move from
clause to clause, or indeed from era to era. There is good evidence,
for example, that when John Locke spoke of the need for the state
"regulation" of property,1 the last thing he had in mind was some
comprehensive mix of zoning and rent control laws. Rather, the
word in all likelihood served two functions: first, it conferred on
states the power to regularize transactions, much in the way in
which the Statute of Frauds and recordation systems worked to
regularize the transfer and protection of real property;2 second, it
1 See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 317 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). See also Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natu-
ral Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2003) (on file with Chapman
Law Review); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cii.
L. REV. 101, 139 (2001).
2 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 139-46 (providing an extensive discussion of the vari-
ous meanings of "to regulate").
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prevented certain improper uses of property that trenched upon
the like rights of other owners.
Although the term "regulatory taking" is a creature of the
1970s or even the 1980s,4 it is clear that the question of how to
respond to government regulations that fell short of direct occupa-
tion was an issue that dominated much of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries-which spoke of "'invasions' of property
rights" by some (but not all) regulation.' However much terminol-
ogy may change, my thesis here is very simple. Anyone who is
serious about the interaction between individual rights and state
controls will gravitate toward the same set of principles no matter
what their point of departure-historical or textual. The logic of
the argument provides the critical impetus for particular discus-
sions. History is necessary in the sense that any judge, dealing
with any particular question, will happen upon the same solution.
To understand the framework, therefore, is to grasp the history.
Note the caveat: this method will only work if the judges care
about the rightness or wrongness of the outcome not only as a
matter of fidelity to text, but also fidelity to principle. On this all
too critical question of initial sentiment, the key variable is the
level of seriousness that is brought to the task in question. The
regrettable legacy of the judicial deference that so influences the
United States Supreme Court is intellectual incoherence and judi-
cial irresponsibility.' Congress and the states will always be able
to do whatever they choose because courts will turn intellectual
cartwheels to elude substantive guarantees or jurisdictional limi-
tations. As applied to the manifold manifestations of government
taxation and regulation, the so-called "rational basis" test is the
death knell of serious constitutional discourse. The question,
then, is what greater level of scrutiny is needed to energize courts
to engage in serious forms of review. Here the key insight is that
the three flavors of constitutional review-strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny and rational basis, in descending order-are not
equidistant. The gap between rational basis and intermediate
scrutiny represents a deep chasm, while that between intermedi-
ate scrutiny and strict scrutiny presents only a manageable gulf.
3 See Claeys, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21-22). See also LocKE, supra note 1, at
310.
4 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981) (first
Supreme Court case recognizing the term "regulatory" taking). See generally Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
5 Claeys, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3). Claeys has the historian's eye for a good
quotation and I borrow from his quotations liberally and without attribution.
6 For the most recent illustrations of the intellectual breakdown, see Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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To see why, note that the key inquiry under rational basis is
whether a court can identify some significant advantage to any
given piece of legislation, at which point it becomes no part of its
duty to weigh that advantage against the correlative disadvan-
tages. So long as there is one plus, no one may tote up the mi-
nuses. No major piece of legislation can pass through Congress or
the state legislatures unless it has the backing of at least one sig-
nificant constituency, at which point its private gains, suitably
dressed up, supply all the justification needed to sustain the act.
Intermediate scrutiny blocks off entrance into that safe-harbor.
Instead, the court must now struggle to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of the statute under an oft-implicit norm that
overregulation, either as to means or to ends, is of equal concern
with underregulation. The full range of considerations thus come
before the Court, even in the absence of any insistence that the
state show the powerful and abiding state interest that strict scru-
tiny demands. The analysis of economic liberties and private
property is made rigorous under the full range of considerations
that both parties put before the Court.
My thesis is that once some level of intermediate scrutiny is
imposed, the Court, no matter where it begins, will end up with
the same basic framework that incorporates these familiar ele-
ments: the protection of some core individual right of liberty or
property; the requirement of just compensation; the recognition of
correlative and reciprocal duties; the nondiscrimination and dis-
parate impact constraints on state action; the need to protect
health and safety against nuisance and other externalities; and
the ability to use public power only for public purposes. The exact
way these leitmotifs interact will differ in detail: there is more
room for a just compensation principle with property than with
speech, but the principle will apply in both areas. One example of
the difference might help here: the First Amendment makes it im-
possible to condemn all the shares of the New York Times, even
though that taking would be for a public use, but it does not insu-
late the newspaper from the payment of local property tax (non-
discriminatory, of course) in exchange for the receipt of public
services. The tax represents a benign form of forced exchange be-
cause it in no way impinges on the editorial discretion of the
press.7
The ubiquity of these principles does not mean that the judges
who embraced this form of analysis attached some magical force to
the immutable baselines of the common law, as has been sug-
gested by Cass Sunstein in his highly influential article Lochner's
7 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983).
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Legacy,8 most notably for the proposition that the common law
baselines were treated as though they were the immutable base-
lines or "prepolitical" rules supplied by nature. To be sure, there
has always been a substantial overlap between the basic outlines
of the common law and the usual norms of constitutional law.
How could the outcome be otherwise when the animating concerns
behind both bodies of law deal with personal liberty and private
property?
On all points of detail, however, there is enormous room for
refinement and variation both within the common law and within
the statutory rules that could be used to modify it. In one of its
less distinguished moments, for example, the court (actually Lord
Ellenborogh) in Baker v. Bolton9 held that common law did not
recognize any action for wrongful death. Yet no judge ever sug-
gested that the overturning of this ill-conceived rule amounted to
a violation of the rights of property or liberty of other individuals.
Quite the opposite, the most vocal critic of the common law rule
was Baron Bramwell, who had a strong libertarian bent.'0 The
following year, Lord Ellenborogh also announced that contribu-
tory negligence was a complete defense in ordinary negligence ac-
tions." Yet again, no one has ever seriously suggested that a
general migration to comparative negligence could raise serious
constitutional law difficulties. On this and on countless other
points the common law was subject to withering criticism. Its
rules on privity, proximate causation, assumption of risk, the fel-
low servant doctrine, contributory negligence, and res ipsa loqui-
tur evolved within states and differed among states during the
height of substantive due process. I am aware of no case, how-
ever, that treated any one variation of the common law rules as so
privileged that all others were condemned to constitutional obliv-
ion under the relentless hammer of substantive due process.
Here, as David Bernstein has recently documented with his cus-
tomary thoroughness, constant judicial challenges to these fine
points of tort law were routinely rebuffed in the Supreme Court.2
In some cases the Court upheld statutory reforms of the common
law rules, while in others it altered common law rules in its judi-
cial capacity.' 3 The explanation is simple. The justices said what
8 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987).
9 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
lo For my views on Bramwell generally, see Richard A. Epstein, For a Bramwell Revi-
val, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 246 (1994).
ii Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809).
12 For Bernstein's relentless historical dissection, see David Bernstein, Lochner's Leg-
acy's Legacy, 82 TEx. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2003) (manuscript at 26-28, on file with
Chapman Law Review).
13 See, e.g., Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917) (upholding a Kansas statute
eliminating the fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 574-75, 578-79 (1915) (uphold-
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they meant and meant what they said. They never once articu-
lated a belief that all common law rules were immutable or pre-
political. But they did believe that tort rules typically fell within
the states' police power to regulate health and safety, even when
the Court abolished the contractual defense of assumption of
risk.'4
The ubiquity of these constitutional constants also decisively
answers yet another common charge, namely, that the conceptual
limitations of the English language prevents any powerful invoca-
tion of judicial authority. At root, the principles of economic lib-
erty are no different from those that regulate relations under the
First Amendment or relations among states under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, areas in which stable and successful doctrine
has emerged. My purpose below is to outline what the common
framework rightly entails, and how its ubiquitous presence struc-
tures so much of our constitutional law. I shall begin by noting
the common philosophical frameworks brought to constitutional
interpretation to show how they converge sensibly on a single
model. I shall then take this standard-issue model and apply it to
cases drawn from various doctrinal areas to show how they all
make use of a common conceptual framework.
II. AN ABUNDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
One reason why constitutional law is so difficult is that there
are, to all appearances, multiple philosophical approaches that
can be taken on the critical issues of property rights and personal
liberties.15 Many of the classical writers gravitated to a system of
natural law. Others preferred to use the language of social con-
tract, or at least social compact. Still others stressed the impor-
ing an Ohio statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk defenses for employers with greater than five employ-
ees); Chi., Indianapolis, & Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 563-64, 567 (1913)
(upholding an Indiana statute eliminating the fellow servant rule in railroad cases); Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1912) (upholding a Nebraska statute abrogat-
ing the fellow servant rule and the defense of contributory negligence in railroad cases);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 53, 57 (1910) (upholding an Indiana
statute abolishing the fellow servant rule for railroad employees); Wilmington Star Mining
Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 71-74 (1907) (upholding an Illinois statute abolishing the fellow
servant rule for mining accidents); Minn. Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U.S. 593, 598 (1905) (up-
holding a Minnesota statute abolishing the fellow servant rule in railroad cases); Tullis v.
Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co. 175 U.S. 348, 351, 353-54 (1899) (upholding an Indiana statute
abolishing the fellow servant rule in railroad accidents).
14 See, e.g., Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908) (striking down
parts of the statute on Commerce Clause grounds but never once challenging the statutory
elimination of the assumption of risk defense). The more sensible criticism of the case is
that it gave the state too much power, not too little. See also Richard A. Epstein, The
Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV.
775, 797-800 (1982) (describing the evolution of private workers' compensation plans).
15 For a summary of the various approaches, see MATTHEW H. KRAMER, ET AL., A DE-
BATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES (1998).
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tance of tradition and orderly evolution in the development of
social institutions. Finally, other writers stress the instrumental,
efficiency or functional justifications of property rights as part of a
comprehensive utilitarian, or at least consequentialist approach to
the basic subject. We can thus appeal to natural rights, social con-
tract, traditionalist and utilitarian theories to first design a con-
stitution, and then to interpret its constitutive positions.
There is a common delight among authors to stress the differ-
ences between these stances in the kinds of authority they appeal
to and the sorts of rules that they are said to generate. But in fact
the differences as they play out in practice are small curlicues on
the same larger comprehensive structure. The writers in the nat-
ural tradition knew that natural human tendencies could lead to
both virtuous and destructive human behaviors. They therefore
tended to favor those laws that brought out the best in human
nature, and thus encouraged individual flourishing. The bare ar-
ticulation of their position does not give clear indications as to
what those laws might be, but surely their position has no bite at
all if any arbitrary assemblage of rights and duties will satisfy the
dictates of the theory. So the natural lawyer has to look for
benchmarks for the particular constellation of rights and duties
that he wants to defend in the name of human flourishing.
One obvious benchmark is the kind of legal arrangements
that grow up naturally-that is without any conscious planning
by some central government or agency. That is not difficult to do
because, in the vast sweep of history, nation states with defined
territories come relatively late in the game. Before then, there
were a widespread set of customary practices and norms that
evolved (naturally, of course) in order to keep the peace and to
advance the ends of individual self-preservation. The natural law-
yer looks to those biological imperatives and to the set of custom-
ary practices for inspiration. As early as Gaius and Justinian,
natural law and common practice across nations are yoked to-
gether as part of a single conception.16 But which of these prac-
tices count? Surely only those that lead to the purported end of a
just and sustainable society. The practices of societies that do not
endure cannot be the role model for the rest of us. So the exem-
plar becomes those societies whose rules promote the general wel-
fare of the individuals involved. But why do they do this? Often it
is because they agree that their overall success will be enhanced if
they all agree to abide by certain rules that set up entitlements on
the one hand and impose behavioral restrictions on the other. The
social compact they wish to reach thus advances the utility of all
the members of the group.
16 G. INST. 1.1-7 (Edward Poste trans.); J. INST. 1.1.4.
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It is therefore very hard in practice to disentangle natural law
from customary practice, from social contract, or from general util-
ity. Custom becomes the proof of a natural arrangement. But
that arrangement is a system of trial and error that advances the
general welfare of the people involved. Social contracts may be
fictions, but the terms that are likely to make sense in these con-
tracts are only those that work for the benefit of the various par-
ties to the agreements, which is just what some utilitarian
interested in consequences would desire. In the end, much of con-
stitutional law, and indeed of political theory, is like Roshomon:
each person gets a bit of the elephant and tends to describe it from
one perspective. But the excluded elements come back in some
secondary way. The natural law may not be utilitarian, but it
does look to the utility of certain arrangements to show that they
are in accordance with human nature.
The real task here is to figure out what the synthesis looks
like before going to particular cases. The clusters of observed rela-
tionships are, in one sense, easy to identify. It is hard to think of
how to begin the analysis of any constitutional order without some
presumption in favor of general liberty of action. Why bother with
the entire chore of setting up a constitutional government if we
are comfortable with anarchy on the one hand or with tyranny on
the other? We undertake that enterprise because we need to es-
cape from a state of nature (or original position) in which each
person is beholden to someone without being certain to whom. Yet
tyranny itself needs no principles of separation of powers, checks
and balances, or individual rights. The unwillingness to accept
any special hierarchy, such as that involved with the divine right
of kings, introduces notions of equal or like liberty on the ground
floor. But freedom of action is only a presumptive good until it is
shown to be an evil, which happens when that action is used to
limit the like liberty of other individuals.
It is of such naive stuff that we can trace the origins of indi-
vidual autonomy, which figures large in anyone's system. Forget
the difficult debates over euthanasia: is there anyone who thinks
that any of the four approaches could be invoked to limit the
choice of all individuals to accept or decline medical treatment of
their own free will? Or is there any system that holds that no
individuals should ever be allowed to acquire property out of a
state of nature so that all individuals would starve for want of a
universal agreement that might legitimize their actions? There is,
in fact, a remarkable convergence to the rule of occupancy (first
possession) in both Roman and common law countries, coupled
with recognition that some limitations must be placed on the prin-
ciple in certain circumstances. But those limitations are not in-
voked when large numbers of ordinary individuals are allowed to
[Vol. 6:1
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act in an uncoordinated fashion to claim some portion of the com-
mons for themselves. Some people stress that all others give their
"implied consent" when one person takes property out of the com-
mons. Others refrain from the use of consent language and prefer
to say that necessity is the origin of property, by which they mean
that all individuals will perish unless they can avail themselves of
nature's abundance. 7 But no matter which way the point is put,
free individuals must be allowed to acquire and to retain property
in order to survive. Every version of legal theory reaches this
same result.
By the same token, there is no legal theory that will treat all
property rights as though they were absolute when real dangers
may well come from their excessive protection. In most cases, two
limitations must be respected in order for institutions of liberty
and property to survive. First, no one must be able to engage in
actions that compromise the like liberty of other individuals. So
long as self-preservation is the end of social organization, it will
hardly do to allow one person to take steps that would maim or
kill another. Hence the mutual renunciation of force becomes a
hallmark of all natural law, social contract, and utilitarian theo-
ries of rights. In dealing with property, this proposition translates
itself into the standard formula that no person is allowed to use
his property to injure the property of another, which becomes the
entering wedge for the common law of nuisance.
In some situations, moreover, the law of nuisance may well
not suffice because there are system-wide social harms that can
emerge even when one person does not invade the property of an-
other, either by direct entry or by casting waste or fumes or other
substances on his land. It is possible to think of limitations that
could be imposed on all members of a given community for the
benefit of all. The law thus has to respond to a variety of "pris-
oner's dilemma" games where the compensation given to each
comes in the form of like restrictions imposed on the activities of
others. For example, we have restrictions on the extent to which
people can kill game or capture fish from the common pool in light
of the risk that untrammeled access will reduce the stock on which
all depend. We have developed a set of rules that limits access
and seeks to guarantee fairness among the members by insisting
that the rule hit as hard on one as it does on the other. We there-
fore use nondiscrimination principles as a way to limit state dis-
cretion when it is not quite clear just what form of restriction
should be imposed in the first place.
However, in some instances, as when land is needed for a fort,
the nondiscrimination principle will not suffice because it makes
17 For a clear statement of both views, see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *6.
Chapman Law Review
no sense to take scraps of land from hundreds of people when
what is needed is a compact parcel of land located at a single criti-
cal point. So one person has to bear the brunt of government ac-
tion that works for the benefit of all, rendering the
nondiscrimination principle useless for the task at hand. The nat-
ural lawyer claims that compensation is owed to the party or par-
ties singled out to bear a disproportionate share of the social
burden. The social contract theorist comes out the same way be-
cause no individual would agree to join society if his fellows could
confiscate all that he owned, even for some public purpose from
which everyone benefited. And the utilitarian sees compensation
as the way in which we have some guarantee that the project in
question will produce social value in excess of the costs to its mem-
bers. But all agree that the state only has this power for the bene-
fit of society at large. No one would agree, for example, to a
system wherein an individual could pay the legislature a fixed
sum of money to condemn property that it would then turn over to
him.
So, in quick succession, we have all the elements: private
property; police power controls; common pool risks; nondiscrimi-
nation rules; just compensation; and public use. Many of these
elements were expressed quite succinctly by Chancellor Kent in
his leading nineteenth century Commentaries on American Law:
"Every individual has as much freedom in the acquisition, use,
and disposition of his property, as is consistent with good order,
and the reciprocal rights of others."18 Similar sentiments were ex-
pressed in Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance: "The constitution is
certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and
is the supreme law of the land.... "19 It "says to legislators, thus
far ye shall go and no further."" Thus,
[e]very person ought to contribute his proportion for public pur-
poses and public exigencies; but no one can be called upon to
surrender or sacrifice his whole property, real and personal, for
the good of the community, without receiving a recompense in
value. This would be laying a burden upon an individual, which
ought to be sustained by the society at large.21
All the necessary ingredients are present in these quotations. The
proposition that the Constitution is certain and fixed knocks out
the ad hoc inquiries of the rational basis test. The rights of acqui-
sition, use, and disposition capture the essence of property. The
reference to good order is, albeit somewhat loose, a hint of the role
of the law of nuisance. The reference to reciprocal rights and du-
18 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 265 (New York, 0. Halsted 1827).
19 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795).
20 Id. at 311.
21 Id. at 310.
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ties talks about the principle of equal liberty and works in tandem
with the concept of proportionate contributions, which is the sig-
nal to a flat tax for the overall goods of the community at large,
thereby negating any putative anarchist tendencies.22
In modern terms, the bottom line is that the presumption of
liberty can be overcome only in those cases of a socially destruc-
tive "prisoner's dilemma" game or a genuine externality. Ordi-
nary market competition does not fall into either of these
categories. To be sure, all sellers in a given market face a pris-
oner's dilemma game, but the game is a virtuous antidote to mo-
nopoly power, which itself has always been regarded as an
appropriate subject of regulation. This concept was made clear by
Justice Peckham in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,23
who six years later wrote the Supreme Court's majority opinion in
the much maligned case of Lochner v. New York.24 The usual ar-
guments against monopoly treated the single seller (like a com-
mon carrier) as though it had the power of coercion over
individuals. That use of terminology creates the unfortunate im-
pression that the refusal to deal is the same as putting a gun to
someone's head, when no sane individual would be indifferent to
those two possibilities. The point here is to express the uneasi-
ness of putting any person in the position where he or she has no
choices in obtaining goods needed for survival or convenience.
That person-to-person view of matters dovetails neatly with the
standard economic concern that output under monopoly is typi-
cally lower than it is under competition. Where monopoly is nec-
essary (i.e., in cases of natural monopoly in which the costs of
production decline over the relevant range of production), the
forced break-up of a firm makes little sense, and rate regulation,
fully tolerated in the nineteenth century, becomes the appropriate
mode of attack on this social dislocation.
There is nothing about this approach that necessarily depreci-
ates with time. When the affection for fixed and certain rules is
articulated in modern cases, statutes are routinely struck down.
Thus, the most famous blanket statement about property comes in
a single sentence from Justice Black's opinion in Armstrong v.
United States, which struck down an effort by the government to
wipe out the superior ship liens (yes, a lien is property) by the
simple expedient of taking the boat out of Maine waters." The
22 "'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and 'tis fit
every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion
for the maintenance of it." LocKE, supra note 1, at 380. See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), reprinted in 36 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 401-49 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 2d ed. 1990).
23 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
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Court held that "[tihe Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."26 But when the chips
were down in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,27
the Court abandoned any effort to articulate rules, and instead
wrote:
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," this
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set
formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons.2"
Downgrade the core proposition of Armstrong into a depen-
dent clause, and the Supreme Court can talk its way into the con-
fiscation of air rights (for an admitted public use, to be sure)
without a dime in compensation. We thus see in action one of the
major techniques used to undermine the classical synthesis, a
mixture of linguistic doubt and conceptual mushiness that trans-
lates itself effortlessly into a plea for legislative discretion. In
making this defense of conceptual clarity, I do not wish to go on
the fool's errand of denying that this conceptual framework cuts
out all wiggle room in particular cases. There are lots of marginal
questions, as with any other legal framework: Just how many peo-
ple must benefit for some use to be considered public? How does
the nondiscrimination principle apply when all persons are not in
26 Id. at 49. The Court recently reiterated Armstrong's rationale in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
27 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
28 Id. at 123-24 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (internal
citations omitted) (alterations in original). The passage then continues:
Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be
rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental ac-
tion. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interfer-
ence arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good.
Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958))
(internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). I have argued at length for the intellec-
tual coherence of this position in Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law:
Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, in CATO SuP. CT. REV. 5-29 (2002).
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quite the same place to begin with? How do property protections
apply to water, where metes and bounds can establish boundaries
between riparians? Or how does protection apply to the various
forms of intellectual property? How does the police power apply
when one statute both promotes health and blocks competition in
different proportions at the same time? Such is life in the big city,
for these doubts arise in connection with any area of law, includ-
ing federalism and First Amendment cases, where it has never
been regarded as so serious an obstacle as to junk the entire appa-
ratus. The differences in application, however, should not conceal
the universality of the relevant building blocks.
III. THE THEORY APPLIED
In order to show how these pieces may be sensibly assembled,
I shall examine cases drawn from four different substantive areas.
Sometimes their doctrinal home-due process, property, contract,
speech, religion-is difficult to pin down, but that is precisely the
point. What matters is not the doctrinal pigeon hole, but the level
of scrutiny and the concomitant willingness to apply the general
framework. Here is how the analysis runs.
One of the most important economic liberties cases during the
late nineteenth century was In re Jacobs,29 which struck down a
statute that made it illegal for individuals to manufacture tobacco
products in tenement units located in cities whose population ex-
ceeded 500,000.30 As befits the general thesis, the New York
Court of Appeals did not trouble itself unduly with the question of
whether the case was best thought of as a case involving the depri-
vation of property or of liberty, because the same conceptual frame
applied to both. On the property side, the statute did not, of
course, dispossess Jacobs from his own premises but only re-
stricted its use, so that today it would be analyzed under the ru-
bric of a regulatory taking. But here the Court thought the loss of
use (not all use, but this particular use only) constituted a taking
and held: "[Any law which destroys it or its value, or takes away
any of its essential attributes, deprives the owner of his prop-
erty.""1 This language is indeed very tough because the attributes
of property refer to the rights of possession, use, and disposition
that have always been regarded as the essentials of property from
Roman times forward. Further, there is no intimation that this
rule only applies after the plaintiff is somehow deprived of "all"
viable economic use of the property, to use the modern standard.32
29 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
30 Id. at 115.
31 Id. at 105.
32 The standard is enunciated most forcefully in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). For its tortured application in connection with spe-
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By the same token, we should be careful as to what is meant by
"destroys its value," for here it is the removal of the incident of
ownership that results in that loss of value. The case would have
come out quite the opposite way if economic value had been lost
because the construction of new buildings had reduced the value
of Jacob's tenement. The line between competition and protection-
ism applies no matter what clause is at issue. Unless there is a
restriction on use, the risks of any change in value, positive or
negative, fall to the property owner.
The same analysis is also applied to the liberty side of the
equation because the statute in question "arbitrarily deprives him
of his property and of some portion of his personal liberty."33 Here
again it was sufficient that some aspect of liberty was lost, even if
other aspects were retained. Consistent with that view, the Court
rejected the proposition that liberty should be defined to cover
only those cases of imprisonment or loss of motion:
Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country, means
the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprison-
ment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his liveli-
hood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation.34
The term "lawful" here is not a "weasel word," but was used in
part to connote that the manufacture of tobacco had been tradi-
tionally allowed elsewhere, and continued to be allowed every-
where in New York State, except for New York City and Brooklyn.
At the first stage, therefore, Jacobs gives the terms property
and liberty the same broad meanings that they have in ordinary
common law. No compensation of any sort was offered to Jacobs,
so the case turned on the question of whether the statute bore a
reasonable relationship to health and safety. 5 On that point, the
alarm bells once again sounded. Although smoking tobacco could
easily be regarded as dangerous, why so its manufacture? And if
its manufacture was dangerous, why only in two large cities
(Brooklyn was then a separate city) and not everywhere in New
York State? If allowed everywhere in workplaces, then why not in
homes, especially if the odors could not be detected in the next
room? If allowed in single-family homes, then why not in tene-
ments with three or more units? Although the Court in Jacobs
could not have been populated with trained public choice econo-
mists, the text of the statute itself gives clear evidence that strong
cific building restrictions, see Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 46-49 (1994), and
Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995).
33 Jacobs, 98 N.Y. at 105.
34 Id. at 106.
35 Id. at 115.
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factions sought to rig labor markets to frustrate competition from
small independent operations. The case thus impinges both lib-
erty and property in circumstances where there is no particular
reason to distinguish between them. Indeed, once the New Deal
jurisprudence took hold, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 did
regulate home labor for just these anticompetitive reasons.16 All
that it took to change the worldview was to combine a narrow defi-
nition of the property taken with a capacious reading of the police
power: a one-two punch that is devastating to any coherent ac-
count of economic liberties.
As should be evident now, the decision in Lochner sits com-
fortably within the mainstream when read in light of the decision
in Jacobs. As everyone knows, Lochner was convicted under a
New York Statute that forbade any employee from working in cer-
tain kinds of bakeries for more than ten hours a day. The initial
question was whether the liberty of contract under the Due Pro-
cess Clause was infringed. Here, there could be no barrier of sub-
stantive due process after cases like Jacobs because, as was often
done in this era, the phrase "without due process of law" was con-
strued to cover cases where losses were imposed without just com-
pensation. With that doctrinal point to one side, the first
question involved the scope of liberty under the Due Process
Clause. Here, in language that parallels the broad definition of
property in Jacobs, Justice Peckham relied on the strong answer
he gave in Allgeyer v. Louisiana:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means, not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to em-
brace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and es-
sential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur-
poses above mentioned.s
Once again, compensation is not in the picture, so everything
turns on the police power. There was a close debate between Jus-
36 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1998).
37 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235
(1897) (noting the equivalence between the requirements of due process and just compensa-
tion); Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) (holding
that depriving railroads of the right to charge reasonable rates under an administrative
order was tantamount "in substance and effect" to a deprivation of property without due
process of law).
38 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). The Louisiana statute struck down in Allgeyer prohibited
any out-of-state firm from entering into a contract for marine insurance unless it was li-
censed to do business in Louisiana, even when the contract was concluded in New York. Id.
at 579 (dead meat under the modern interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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tices Peckham and Harlan, but the incomplete coverage of the
statute (some but not all bakers, exempted employers, and self-
employed individuals), coupled with the clear anticompetitive pur-
pose (nonunion bakers worked longer shifts and slept on the job),
made the anticompetitive element stronger. In addition, the re-
moval of part time from the work place made it difficult to treat
the case as one of continuous exposure with major cumulative
losses, which is how Justice Harlan imagined the case to be. My
point here is not so much to defend the particular result in the
case, as to point out that it turns on the relative proportions of
anticompetitiveness. This case comes close to the cusp. But it
does not indicate that the line was not worth drawing. When all
health aspects were removed from the case in Adair v. United
States,39 Justice Harlan switched sides and struck down a statute
that authorized mandatory collective bargaining on the rail-
roads.4 ° All monopoly issues and no health issues removed the
mixed motive issues under the police power.
Indeed, a unanimous Supreme Court sustained the work-
men's compensation statute against constitutional challenge in a
decision by Justice Pitney,41 just two years after he correctly
struck down a state statute that authorized collective bargaining
in Coppage v. Kansas.42 The point here has nothing to do with the
immutable nature of the common law, for both of these statutes
mark limitations on freedom of contract. Rather, this is a case
where the judges said what they meant and meant what they said.
They could see the connection between worker's -compensation
statutes on the one hand, and worker health and safety on the
other. No such connection was discernible with the labor issue.
The broad definition of liberty given in Allgeyer is not only
important for economic matters, but is capable of principled ex-
pansion into a range of other issues as well. Just that type of ex-
pansion took place in two key cases: Meyer v. Nebraska43 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.4 4 The former case overturned a convic-
tion for teaching the German language to schoolchildren. 45 The
latter overturned a rule that prohibited the education of children
in parochial schools.46 Both of these statutes fell within the broad
definition of liberty adopted by Justice McReynolds, who wrote:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to en-
39 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
40 Adair, 208 U.S. at 180.
41 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 209 (1917).
42 Coppage, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
43 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
44 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
46 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536.
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gage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
47
Before dismissing those words as idle chatter, it is worthwhile
to recall the forces that McReynolds, himself an anti-Semite, had
derailed. The 1922 Oregon statute struck down in Pierce did not
have a noble heritage.
The measure was supported by Masons, the Ku Klux Klan, and
patriotic societies and vociferously opposed by Roman Catholic
groups, Lutherans, and Seventh-Day Adventists, as well as
much of the state's press. The purpose of the measure was to
destroy nonpublic schools, which enrolled only seven percent of
the children in the state.48
Consistent with the general analysis, McReynolds did not ig-
nore the role of police power justifications, but noted that the state
had the power
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and ex-
amine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all chil-
dren of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of
good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.49
He did not go into the details of this explication, and had no occa-
sion to address the genuine risk that state regulation pursuant to
this mandate could be made so onerous and costly as to make it
impossible for any private school to function-which is why the
intermediate scrutiny standard must be maintained in the first
place. However, it is painfully clear that this total ban had to fail
under any police power justification, except for the autocratic
claim that state security depends on state domination, which
marred Justice Frankfurter's ill-starred marriage of safety and
national security in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.5 °
47 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
48 Diane Ravitch, American Traditions of Education, in A PRIMER ON AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 12 (Terry M. Moe ed., 2001).
49 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
50 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). Justice Frankfurter wrote in an indirect appeal to the safety element of
the police power justification:
Nor does the freedom of speech assured by Due Process move in a more absolute
circle of immunity than that enjoyed by religious freedom. Even if it were as-
sumed that freedom of speech goes beyond the historic concept of full opportunity
to utter and to disseminate views, however heretical or offensive to dominant opin-
ion, and includes freedom from conveying what may be deemed an implied but
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The modern dislike of Lochner and substantive due process
has not led to the repudiation of either Meyer or Pierce, but simply
to their recharacterization. 1 They are now treated as involving
First Amendment rights of speech, association, and religion. That
shift cannot be justified on the ground that Meyer and Pierce mis-
applied their own conceptual framework. Rather, that opportu-
nistic shift only makes sense for one reason: the level of scrutiny is
higher so that the rational basis analysis is not allowed to eviscer-
ate the basic protection through a broad reading of the police
power, which in these areas is kept within the traditional bounda-
ries it occupied for economic liberties elsewhere.
The Supreme Court has, to say the least, been inconsistent in
applying this general framework in all religious contexts. In Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, 2 Justice Scalia took the position that
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not extend
to illegal actions (here, the smoking of peyote under tightly con-
trolled circumstances). The resulting outcry is best explained by
one simple reason. The health and safety justifications for the
drug prohibition in this limited circumstance looks to be vanish-
ingly weak, so much so that the state itself had not bothered to
prosecute, so that collaterally the issue was raised on the question
of whether Smith could be denied employment benefits because of
the commission of this particular crime. Justice Scalia held that
the Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an individual of the ob-
ligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'54 Note what this for-
mulation does to the general inquiry. It concedes that religious
liberty is abridged, but then avoids the negative implications of
that position by holding that the police power requirement is sat-
isfied so long as the rule, any rule, is one of generally applicability.
In effect the decision relies on a formal account of nondiscrimina-
tion to insulate from a review a statute that has, to say the least, a
disparate impact on the individuals subject to its commands.
Smith, it must be recalled, does not raise the bogus claim that the
rejected affirmation, the question remains whether school children, like the Gobi-
tis children, must be excused from conduct required of all the other children in the
promotion of national cohesion. We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in
the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national security. To
deny the legislature the right to select appropriate means for its attainment
presents a totally different order of problem from that of the propriety of subordi-
nating the possible ugliness of littered streets to the free expression of opinion
through distribution of handbills.
Id.
51 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 491 (12th ed. 1991).
52 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
53 Id. at 878-79.
54 Id. at 879.
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free exercise of religion is so broad as to allow the members of
Smith's tribe to smoke peyote (let alone cyanide) whenever and
wherever they so choose. Nor is it, evidently, a case where the
religious group defends its right to receive welfare benefits with-
out having to contribute a penny in funding.
In some cases, however, the police power issues are a bit
closer. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi-
aleah,55 the practitioners of the Santeria religion, brought by
slaves from Africa to Cuba, engaged in widespread ritual slaugh-
ter which the City of Hialeah sought to prohibit by an emergency
ordinance as "inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety."56
An exception was made for slaughters undertaken by licensed es-
tablishments for slaughtering animals for ordinary consumption.
In striking down the ordinance, Justice Kennedy hit on all the fa-
miliar themes in his analysis of the singling out of some religious
groups for special treatment, noting how the animus directed to a
particular group could taint an otherwise neutral ordinance.57 As
in Pierce, the Court noted that ordinances narrower than a total
ban could achieve whatever legitimate goals it had, whether mea-
sured in terms of the protection of animals from unnecessary cru-
elty or the public at large from pollution."8 Indeed in this case, the
questions of fit were treated as especially urgent because the en-
tire ordinance was subject to "the most rigorous of scrutiny."59
Perhaps, the analysis would have come out somewhat differ-
ently under a standard of intermediate scrutiny, which is in gen-
eral appropriate for questions of property and liberty. But no
matter. To be sure, it is easy to identify some cases that come
close to the line. It is no surprise that no matter what standard is
used, some cases will always be close to the line. But no matter
how clear the conceptual judgment that certain laws limit the ex-
ercise of liberty, the matter of justification is not. Any use of inter-
mediate scrutiny must balance two kinds of error. The process in
turn invites a large amount of evidence that, when the dust set-
tles, necessarily gives rise to a subset of cases that will be in equi-
poise, or nearly so. Equipoise is a fact of life under any legal
regime. The key question is whether the right questions have
placed the balance point at the right juncture.
IV. FEDERALISM QUESTIONS
Thus far I have shown how the same principles play out
across the full range of property and liberty interests. It is equally
55 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
56 Id. at 526.
57 Id. at 534.
58 Id. at 538-39.
59 Id. at 546.
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important to realize that these principles give a good deal of infor-
mation about the rules governing federalism as well. At first
blush, it might be thought that the principles that deal with the
coordination of activities among states bear little resemblance to
those that organize the relationship of the individual to the state.
But this conclusion is erroneous. The point can be made by look-
ing at cases under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Here, it
hardly matters that the constitutional pedigree for the recognition
of any Dormant Commerce Clause is most uneasy.6" But for these
purposes, it hardly matters whether the clause exists or not. The
basic point is that the success of the doctrine rests on the fact that
the cases that seek to explicate the Dormant Commerce Clause all
begin with the basic realization that the purpose of the clause is to
preserve a competitive environment in which both in and out-of-
state firms may compete on a level playing field. The distaste for
special privilege is now carried over to condemn any advantages
afforded in-staters at the expense of out-of-staters. Any barrier to
trade, whether in the form of a tax, permit, or regulation, imposed
on an outsider, is a form of economic protection for the insiders,
just as the restrictions struck down in Jacobs and Lochner were
understood to be anticompetitive "labor" statutes.
At this point we face problems that have an identical struc-
ture to those that deal with questions of individual rights. Does
the state action constitute an interference with liberty? If so,
what justifications may be offered for the restrictions imposed?
Any articulation of the inquiry will involve the same cluster of
concepts used to evaluate state restrictions imposed on individual
rights, and the outcome will depend critically on the standard of
review that is brought to these matters. On this issue the tena-
cious judicial commitment to free trade across state borders (un-
less Congress intervenes) has proven strong enough to create a
durable body of state law that shows no deference to legislative
intention.
To see how the difference in standards plays out, it is instruc-
tive to start with a contrast between individual due process and
federalism claims. Consider the comparison of Nebbia v. New
York61 with Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. ,62 both of which involved
60 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEAS, 1789-1888, at 173 (1985).
The wording of the clause suggests no limitation on the states; it merely grants
Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce." This language contrasts vividly
with Congress's power of "exclusive Legislation" over the District of Columbia and
with the various provisions of article I, section 10, expressly forbidding states to
invade such federal preserves as the making of treaties or the coining of money.
Id.
61 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
62 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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the ongoing saga of monopoly regulation and protectionist prac-
tices in the dairy industry. In Nebbia, the question was whether
the state acted beyond its power when it sought to set the mini-
mum price that retailers could charge for milk. The Milk Control
Board had set a price of nine cents per quart, and the defendant
was subject to criminal penalties for selling two quarts of milk for
eighteen cents because he threw a five cent loaf of bread into the
bargain. The defendant argued that it was beyond the power of
the state to set minimum prices for milk because the dairy indus-
try was not "affected with a public interest" because that industry
was not a public utility, and did not hold any monopoly power."
In urging this position, the defendant appealed to a long tra-
dition. Sir Matthew Hale' had first used the phrase "affected
with the public interest" in the seventeenth century to explain
why the rates charged for individuals who operated a public
wharf-that is, a wharf to which all must come to load and un-
load-could not charge whatever rates they choose, but must
charge rates that were only "reasonable and moderate." Hale sup-
plied the decisive argument for Allnutt v. Inglis,65 in which the
state monopoly was a licensed customs house for goods bound for
export free of local custom duties. Lord Ellenborough held that
the licensee's monopoly power justified limitations on rates.
There is no doubt that the general principle is favored both in
law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases
upon his own property or the use of it: but if, for a particular
purpose, the public have a right to resort to his premises and
make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that pur-
pose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must as an
equivalent perform the duty attached to it on reasonable
terms.6
In that case it meant that the licensed warehouse could
charge only the rates that other warehouses, acting in competitive
markets, could charge customers for goods bound for sale in En-
gland. The principle articulated in Allnutt was carried over to the
United States in Munn v. Illinois,67 which rejected a constitutional
challenge to the maximum rates that Illinois set for grain eleva-
tors that operated along-side the railroad tracks on the grounds
that they were "affected with a public interest."' In his Munn
opinion, Chief Justice Waite quoted extensively from both Hale
63 Id. at 531.
64 Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, reprinted in FRANcis HARGRAVE, A COLLEC-
TION OF TRACTs RELATIVE TO THE LAw OF ENGLAND (1787).
65 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810).
66 Id. at 210-11.
67 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
68 Id. at 130.
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and Allnutt,69 and included Hale's reference to legal monopoly.7 °
Chief Justice Waite also alluded to some agreement among the
grain operators, but stopped short of calling this "'virtual' monop-
oly" a cartel, only to conclude that any remedy for the operators
lay at the polls and not with the Court. 71 Justice Field, a consis-
tent libertarian, issued a stinging dissent to the effect that if grain
elevators were affected with the public interest, then so, too, was
every other business.72 But Justice Field remained eerily quiet on
the issue of monopoly power lurking in the background.73
Nebbia rejected the previous tests altogether by upholding
New York's minimum prices for milk on the ground that the dairy
industry, like every major business, was affected with the public
interest solely in virtue of its size and importance to the public at
large.74 Thus, Nebbia neatly transformed a concept initially de-
signed to limit monopoly power into one that propped up state-
sponsored cartels, in part on the dubious public health ground
that higher costs offered protection against contamination and
spoilage.75 The net effect is that the rejection of the older tests
came from the unwillingness of the court to distinguish between
the allocative effects of competition and monopoly. But the Court
took quite a different attitude one year later in Baldwin, where
the question was whether the Milk Control Board was within its
rights to prohibit sales within New York of out-of-state milk that
had been purchased at below the minimum prices set for buying
milk within the state.76 In effect, an outsider was not licensed to
sell milk within the state unless it agreed to price its milk in ac-
cordance with the state regulation of imported milk. Justice Car-
dozo hit the nail on the head when he noted that the regulation in
question was equal to a tax in the amount of the difference be-
69 Id. at 126-28.
70 Id. at 128.
71 Id. at 131.
72 Id. at 141 ("[T]here is hardly an enterprise or business engaging the attention and
labor of any considerable portion of the community, in which the public has not an interest
in the sense in which that term is used by the court in its opinion ....").
73 For a detailed account of the economic arrangements that support the monopoly
view, see Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, in 1978 THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEw 313-43 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1979).
74 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 531-32. The Court stated:
We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted sense of
the phrase, a public utility. We think the appellant is also right in asserting that
there is in this case no suggestion of any monopoly or monopolistic practice. It
goes without saying that those engaged in the business are in no way dependent
upon public grants or franchises for the privilege of conducting their activities.
But if, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to regulation in the public
interest, what constitutional principle bars the state from correcting existing mal-
adjustments by legislation touching prices? We think there is no such principle.
Id.
75 Id. at 516-17.
76 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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tween the local and imported prices."7 Accordingly, he held that
the state could not insulate local sellers from competition from
outside the state by adopting a tax that eradicated the outsider's
price advantage. Now competition became the dominant motif:
If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her
farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper
prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and re-
prisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce
between the states to the power of the nation.7"
Clearly, this statement raises the issue of state retaliation not
found in the internal regulation that one state imposes on the
property and liberty of its citizens. From this difference, it might
be inferred that consumer welfare in the abstract was not the
touchstone of the Dormant Commerce Clause. No matter; the crit-
ical point remains the same regardless of the judicial motivations.
Once the court cares about state competition, for whatever rea-
sons, it then has the means in its power to see through the various
schemes that could frustrate its operations. The indifference be-
tween competition and monopoly that was so evident in Nebbia
was nowhere to be found in Baldwin, where a higher level of scru-
tiny led to the correct result.79 The same conviction of the vital
role for interstate competition led, in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond,"° to the invalidation of an effort by New York's Commis-
sioner of Agriculture and Markets to refuse to issue a permit to an
out-of-state distributor because of his fear that "destructive com-
petition" would disrupt the stability of markets that were already
"adequately served.""1 Once again, the decision struck down the
operation of a state-run cartel. But locals would have no recourse
against the same form of favoritism.
Cases like Baldwin and Hood did raise the theme of nondis-
crimination against outsiders, but they did not raise the tradi-
tional tensions that arise in drawing the line between legitimate
state police regulations for health and safety, and the suppression
of competition-which is the precise issue in cases like Jacobs and
Lochner. However, in this context, the Supreme Court did care
about the outcome. The distinction the Court drew came from the
same sensible level of scrutiny (more strict than intermediate in
fact) that it could have brought to claims for the protection of indi-
vidual rights. Here it is sufficient to refer briefly to two well-
known cases.
77 Id. at 526.
78 Id. at 522.
79 Id. at 527, 528.
8o 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
81 Id. at 529.
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In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,2 the City of Madison adopted
an ordinance that required all milk sold within the city to be pas-
teurized at an approved plant near the city's central square. The
state barred Dean from selling milk that had been pasteurized in
Illinois or elsewhere in Wisconsin. Consumer safety was the pur-
ported justification for this local ordinance, but the entire issue
was rightly dismissed as a sham when it was shown that Dean
Milk had been processing its milk in conformity with Illinois and
Wisconsin law, without visible adverse effects on consumers any-
where.83 No one could object to the health ends of the statute, but
it took only a few sentences to realize that the Madison ordinance
had one purpose, "erecting an economic barrier protecting a major
local industry against competition from without the State," a con-
clusion that was reached even though some in-state milk was
caught by the prohibition as well.84 To allow the restriction to re-
main simply because some in-staters were disadvantaged would
not do, as that was the price the local merchants of Madison would
have happily paid to achieve their own local cartel. Hence the
tougher rule was properly applied, sparing the need to have the
Wisconsin Court strike down the Madison ordinance as special
legislation of the worst kind. 5
Yet in Maine v. Taylor,"6 a ban on the importation of bait-fish
was held justified, here under a virtual strict scrutiny standard,
because of a clear showing of the possible dangers of parasites and
nonnative species on local flora and fauna." But the clear impli-
cation of all this is that the states could not keep out apples
treated with alar on some supposed health ground. Because the
Court cares about competition, it does not let purported health
and safety justifications under the police power swallow the basic
constitutional provision.
This affection for the competitive solution does not, however,
carry over to laws that sanction the adoption of rules neutral on
their face but with disparate impacts against out-of-state firms.
The clear sign that the level of scrutiny has been reduced is the
refusal to look with suspicion on facially neutral rules passed with
strategic intent, which characterized Justice Kennedy's First
Amendment decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye."8 The
lower level of scrutiny allows the disparate impact and legislative
motive to disappear from the judicial radar screen, so that results
start to flip over.
82 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
83 Id. at 352.
84 Id. at 354.
85 Id. at 356.
86 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
87 Id. at 148.
s 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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Two examples illustrate this trend. In Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland,89 the Supreme Court sustained a Maryland stat-
ute that prohibited producers and refiners of petroleum products
from operating retail establishments within the state.90 There
were no local producers and refiners, so the statute hit solely
against out-of-state parties. Justice Stevens did not ask what cir-
cumstances could have justified this prohibition on entry, and he
certainly did not argue that the vertical integration (commonplace
in the industry) posed any antitrust problem. Rather, he con-
tented himself with noting that much competition remained at the
retail level even after the statute.9 1 For Justice Stevens, it was
enough that independent interstate dealers could enter the mar-
ket.92 But the implicit targeting of one segment of the market
must distort competitive forces locally, so that using the higher
standard of scrutiny, now reserved to explicit discrimination
against out-of-staters, would have produced a different result.
There is no discernible state interest to ban an entire class of en-
trants solely because some out-of-state refiners were alleged to
have favored their own retail establishments during the massive
oil shortages brought on by the price controls imposed in 1973 af-
ter the Yom Kippur War.
Judicial deference became a rout in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co.,9 in which the Court upheld a Minnesota statute
that banned the sale of milk in the plastic nonreturnable contain-
ers in common use everywhere in the country.94 Only in Minne-
sota were nonreturnable containers required to be constructed out
of pulpwood. The chief backer of the statute was the local paper
manufacturer. The ostensible justification for the restriction was
to prevent the adverse environmental impact of plastic containers
on solid waste management. The statute was neutral on its face,
but it was known at the time of its passage that its burdens would
fall on out-of-state producers while its benefits would go to the in-
state firms that had supported the statute's passage. No matter.
Without explicit discrimination, the out-of-state firms suffered
only incidental burdens that were not "clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the putative local benefits."95 Unlike Taylor, the purported
environmental justifications did not receive close examination,
but were taken virtually at face value even though no other state
had adopted similar legislation. At no point did Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, recognize the dangers in evaluating this
89 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
90 Id. at 119-21.
91 Id. at 126.
92 Id. at 125-26.
93 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
94 Id. at 473.
95 Id. at 471 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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neutral rule as if it were a random output from the legislative pro-
cess. Justice Brennan turned a blind eye to the fact that the legis-
lature knew the impact of passing the statute, and purposely
chose a neutral rule that effectively advanced protectionist
agenda. This greater deference to facially neutral statutes led to a
reduction in scrutiny of the state's purported police power justifi-
cations. As a result, silly protectionist legislation was allowed to
slip under the constitutional radar.
The imperfect levels of supervision under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause turns on the extent to which the Supreme Court is
prepared to treat the protection of interstate competitive markets
as a constitutional norm. When the discussion shifts from dor-
mant to affirmative power under the Commerce Clause, the com-
petitive ideal no longer informs any fraction of the legal analysis.
With the disappearance of any normative objective, judicial re-
view disappears under the waves as the Court resorts, first implic-
itly and then explicitly, to a see-no-evil version of the "rational
basis" test. 6 The deleterious consequences are clear enough in
connection with agricultural produce cases like Wickard v. Fil-
burn," where concerns with competition took a back seat as the
Commerce Clause was read to allow the expansion of government
sponsored nationwide cartels, here by preventing their erosion by
a farmer feeding his own grain to his livestock.98 The key lesson of
the New Deal is that the Courts routinely yield to Congress on the
question of whether it is best to preserve competition under the
antitrust laws or to foster cartels under some explicit statutory
scheme.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lopez99 and United States v. Morrison'0 ° should be praised, at
least to the extent that they recognize that the doctrine of enumer-
ated powers places some limitation on what Congress may do.
But the entire treatment of the conservative majority is muddled
because the Chief Justice goes to such enormous pains to indicate
that the decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'0o and
96 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (sustaining a federal convic-
tion for "loansharking" under the Consumer Credit Protection Act); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968) (holding the wage and hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Acts
applicable under the Commerce Clause to state governments, hospitals, and school
districts).
97 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
98 For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, The Cartelization of Commerce, 22 HAv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 209 (1998).
99 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
loo 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
o 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
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Wickard continue to meet with judicial approval. 1 2 The skin-deep
nature of the concern for economic liberties is only made more evi-
dent by the frightful performance of the Supreme Court in its re-
cent Eldred v. Ashcroft' decision that upheld the Copyright Term
Extension Act0 4 in an opinion replete with deferential rational ba-
sis language celebrating the power of Congress to do what it will.
The obvious starting point for Eldred was to acknowledge that
this case was in deep tension with the slender Lopez majority, for
if the principle of enumeration places limits on Congressional
power to deal with commerce, then why not with copyrights and
patents as well? One could respond that the Commerce Clause
deals with federalism while the Copyright and Patent Clauses do
not. But that point is false to the extent that the federal power to
grant copyrights and patents necessarily limits the power of the
states to impose their own intellectual property regimes.' 5 More
to the point, with commerce, patents, and copyrights, the deepest
questions concern the scope of Congress's power to create and fos-
ter monopoly for some end. How the Supreme Court thinks about
this power is anyone's guess. Although the connection between
the commerce, patent, and copyright issues was squarely raised in
Judge Sentelle's dissent' 0 -and was the centerpiece of the Eldred
brie 07-none of the three opinions (Ginsburg, Stevens & Breyer)
sought fit to even cite Lopez, let alone resolve the issue. This con-
stant willingness to allow the interpretive standards to shift with
the wind from clause to clause will surely make it impossible to
maintain any consistent constitutional regime that protects eco-
nomic liberty or private property. A pity.
V. CONCLUSION
The major purpose of this Foreword is to show that the atti-
tudes towards economic liberties are not the product of some ran-
dom number generator. Once a court believes in the basic
proposition that the purpose of government is to protect ordered
liberty in all aspects of life, then there is only one way in which it
can undertake constitutional interpretation. It must first begin
with a broad presumption in favor of the protection of liberty and
102 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627 (discussing the decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942)). See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09 (discussing the decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947)).
1O3 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
104 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). I have railed against this act from
the beginning, see Richard A. Epstein, Congress's Copyright Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec.
21, 1998, at A19.
lo5 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
106 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
107 See Petitioner's Brief, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2002) (No. 01-618).
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property, and then require the state to show some strong justifica-
tion as to why that liberty ought to be limited or abridged. The
justifications that most readily present themselves are the control
of externalities, such as pollution, and the need to coordinate the
activities of large numbers of individuals when high transaction
costs preclude voluntary interaction among individuals.
Seen in this light, the question constantly before the Court is
what health and safety needs can justify state regulation under
the police power. The level of scrutiny brought to this question
determines the fate of the entire inquiry. That level is not explic-
itly set in the Constitution, which, for that matter, also contains
no reference to the police power arguments that are necessary to
make it work. History on these subjects therefore often takes the
form of "necessary" history. Those people who subscribe to the
classical liberal framework will, out of sheer intellectual necessity,
use the same set of concepts to evaluate any proposed form of gov-
ernment regulation under intermediate or strict scrutiny. It
makes relatively little difference what particular clause prompts
the challenge. Those people who do not subscribe to the classical
framework will side instead with Justice Holmes in Lochner, who
managed to repudiate the entire tradition of American constitu-
tionalism with a single sentence: "But a Constitution is not in-
tended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or
of laissez faire."'8 That may be true of "a" constitution, but it is
assuredly not true of our own Constitution, which has succeeded
precisely because it does articulate and implement a theory of gov-
ernment. That theory is not one of the organic relation between
the individual and the state. Nor is it one of laissez faire, if that
position is taken to exclude the possibility of police power regula-
tion of health, safety, or taxation, at least in the forms that I have
discussed here. Rather, the strength of our Constitution lies in
the fact that the implicit tradition of classical liberalism that
points the way to a middle road has been intuited and acted on by
justices of all political persuasions.
The somber lesson of this inquiry is that the success of any
constitution depends ultimately on the intellectual orientation
that is brought to the interpretation of its central provisions. Seen
in this light, the remarkable intellectual achievement of the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century is how well judges
succeeded in the area of economic liberties in preserving the ideal
of a free and open society. In the post-New Deal era, the Court
has done well, by and large, in protecting individual liberties in
areas such as speech and religion. It has a somewhat more mixed
108 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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record in cases under the Dormant Commerce Clause. But its
greatest failure has been the dissipation of a precious intellectual
heritage in the preservation of private property and economic
liberties.
The moral should now be clear. Where we end up depends
heavily on where we begin. Anyone who is concerned with limited
government will support a system that has strong property rights
and limits government power to force, fraud, and monopoly. Com-
petition through markets, within and across state boundaries, be-
comes a preferred conception. The case law will reflect that
fundamental choice. Anyone who reads the Federalist Papers
with an open mind will see that they are dominated by concerns
with faction and political abuse, and by the desire to limit the
scope of the public domain, and then to insure that deliberations
within it take place in a responsible matter. No one with that ori-
entation could rest easily with the rational basis gloss that the
Supreme Court places on economic liberties and the Constitution.
My hope is that the necessary history inherent in our Constitution
once again becomes the actual history of the Constitution.
